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ON THE ADJUSTMENT, STABILITY, AND GROWTH
IN PERFECT COMPETITION
MATTI ESTOLA AND VELI-MATTI HOKKANEN
Abstract. We present a model of the behavior of an industry in
perfect competition. A new feature in the modeling is the con-
sumers’ role in the evolution of the industry. We show a link in
between market behavior and economic growth at industry level.
Growth may occur due to increases in technology or consumers’
wealth, due to a positive change in consumers’ preferences concern-
ing this good or increasing returns to scale. The model is solved in
a linear case; sufficient conditions for asymptotic stability in an au-
tonomous nonlinear case are also given. In the autonomous linear
case, the adjustment is exponentially damped where overshooting
may occur. Samuelson’s (1941) model of infinitely quickly adjust-
ing consumers and producers is shown to be a limit case of our
model in the nonlinear autonomous case. (JEL C62, D41)
Keywords: Perfect competition, adjustment, growth, stability.
1. Introduction
According to [14], neoclassical thinking is based on two distinct el-
ements: egoistic economic agents by Smith (utility maximizing con-
sumers by Jevons, Menger andWalras) and the mathematical metaphor
of classical mechanics. The latter can be understood by the progenitors
of neoclassical economics who were engineer level physicists. Concept
equilibrium was borrowed from physics and introduced in economics
by Canard at 1801 [15]. Although equilibrium is ‘a balance of forces’
situation, in economics the balancing ‘forces’ have not been defined.
In order to efficiently exploit the concept of equilibrium, however, we
should be able to know whether the equilibrium is stable or unsta-
ble, and which are the forces ‘pushing’ an economy toward the stable
equilibrium.
The existence of forces acting upon economic quantities can be ar-
gued indirectly; every changing quantity (price, wage, exchange rate
etc.) tells the existence of reasons (forces) causing these changes. This
is analogous with arguing the existence of the gravitational force field
by dropping a pen; without the force field the pen would not move.
Fisher writes, [7, pp. 9–12]: “... I now briefly consider the features
that a proper theory of disequilibrium adjustment should have ... if we
This research is supported by Ellen and Artturi Nyysso¨nen’s Foundation and the
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are to show under what conditions the rational behavior of individual
agents drives an economy to equilibrium. ... Such a theory must in-
volve dynamics with adjustment to disequilibrium over time modeled.
...the most satisfactory situation would be one in which the equations
of motion of the system permitted an explicit solution with the values
of all the variables given as specific, known functions of time. ... Un-
fortunately, such a closed-form solution is far too much to hope for.
...the theory of the household and the firm must be reformulated and
extended where necessary to allow agents to perceive that the economy
is not in equilibrium and to act on that perception. ... A convergence
theory that is to provide a satisfactory underpinning for equilibrium
analysis must be a theory in which the adjustments to disequilibrium
made by agents are made optimally.”
According to [2, p. 12], the presently accepted definition for market
stability is that of [17]. Samuelson writes: “In the history of mechanics,
the theory of statics was developed before the dynamical problem was
even formulated. But the problem of stability of equilibrium cannot
be discussed except with reference to dynamical considerations ... we
must first develop a theory of dynamics.” Samuelson insists that the
stability of a market equilibrium must be based on the dynamic ad-
justment of prices when the system is out of equilibrium. A generally
accepted cause (force) behind price changes is the deviation between
demand and supply. [13, p. 620] writes: ”A characteristic feature that
distinguishes economics from other scientific fields is that, for us, the
equations of equilibrium constitute the center of our discipline. Other
sciences, such as physics or even ecology, put comparatively more em-
phasis on the determination of dynamic laws of change. The reason,
informally speaking, is that economists are good (or so we hope) at
recognizing a state of equilibrium but are poor at predicting precisely
how an economy in disequilibrium will evolve. Certainly there are in-
tuitive dynamic principles: if demand is larger than supply then price
will increase, if price is larger than marginal costs then production will
expand...”
We base our modeling on the above principles. We define the forces
acting upon the production, consumption and unit price of a homoge-
neous good in a perfectly competed industry, and apply these forces to
model economic dynamics in real time. The possible asymptotic equi-
librium of the industry is the neoclassical one: demand equals supply,
price equals the average of firms’ marginal costs and consumers’ will-
ingness to pay for one unit, and the equilibrium velocities of production
(consumption) of firms (consumers) maximize their profit (utility). To
define the ‘economic forces’, we assume that economic agents are not
in their optimal situations, and they like to better their situation as
Fisher required above. We believe that the ‘economic agents’ desire to
better their situation’ is the cause for the dynamics in economies.
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Because price affects the velocities of production and consumption,
which both affect price, we cannot model the adjustment of any of these
quantities separately but have to analyze them simultaneously. Firms
and consumers take the price fixed still knowing that price adjusts at
the market according to the aggregate excess demand. The information
of the market firms and consumers have in their decision-making is
the market price. The adjustment takes place in real time, and there
exists inertial factors resisting changes in the adjusting quantities. [20]
find evidence of price inertia in concentrated industries; the inertia of
economic quantities is thus measurable.
This paper deviates from the existing models of adjustment in per-
fect competition in four ways. Firstly, the measurement units of the
quantities involved are explicitly defined1. By this way and by seek-
ing an analogy with Newtonian mechanics, we are guided to model
production and consumption velocities (the produced and consumed
amounts in a given time unit) rather than their volumes. Secondly,
the existing models (for instance [12]) use a system of two differential
equations where price adjusts according to the deviation between de-
mand and supply, and production adjusts according to the deviation
between price and marginal costs. We add to this a third equation
describing consumer behavior, where consumers adjust their velocities
of consumption according to the deviation between their willingness to
pay for one unit of a good and its unit price. Thirdly, we not only
study the stability of the adjustment, but also possible reasons for eco-
nomic growth. Fourthly, the adjustment takes place in real and not
imaginary time like taˆtonnement, which allows us to study the speed
of the adjustment.
The paper is organized as follows. In Sections 2 and 3 the dynamic
behavior of an individual firm and consumer are defined. The industry
level supply and demand of the studied good are defined in Section 4.
The dynamic model is introduced in Section 5 and solved in a linear
case. In Section 6 the system is assumed a non-autonomous nonlinear
smooth one, and sufficient conditions for the asymptotic behavior and
local stability are given. In Section 8 the smoothness conditions are
replaced by monotonicity ones and sufficient conditions for asymptotic
convergence are given. Conclusions summarizes the main results.
2. An Individual Firm
Firm i operates at a perfectly competed industry with n firms pro-
ducing andm consumers consuming a homogeneous consumption good.
We assume n,m fixed, for simplicity. Let qi(t) denote the velocity of
production (production during time unit y) of firm i and p(t) the unit
price of the good at moment t. The measurement units for qi and p
1A system of measurement units for economics is given in [10].
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are unit/y and $/unit, respectively; y can be one day, week etc. For
brevity, the dimensional constants and quantities are treated as real
valued; all equations are still dimensionally well-defined.
The profit of the one-good firm during time unit y at moment t is
Πi(t) = p(t)qi(t)− Ci
(
t, qi(t)
)
, (1)
where by Ci(t, qi) with unit $/y is denoted the production costs during
time unit y at moment t at the velocity of production qi. Due to tech-
nological progress — the firm’s R & D activities or its workers’ learning
— the cost function and the marginal cost function are non-increasing
in time. On the other hand, the cost function is increasing in the pro-
duction velocity. The marginal cost function positively (negatively)
depends on the velocity of production when decreasing (increasing)
returns to scale prevail in the production. Hence
∂Ci
∂t
≤ 0, ∂Ci
∂qi
> 0,
∂2Ci
∂t∂qi
≤ 0. (2)
Profit function (1) presupposes that the sold and unsold goods are of
equal value, and price is exogenous for the firm. Firms like to sell
their whole production, and they know that the price is determined
according to demand and supply at the market. Firms know that
they can sell their whole production at a unit price low enough, but
unit price under average unit costs creates losses. Assuming that firms
know their cost functions, the uncertainty in planning the velocity of
production of a firm is focused on the maximum unit price the firm’s
whole production gets sold.
At the market, the price adjusts toward the maximal level by which
the production of the industry gets sold. This occurs because excess
demand allows some firms to raise their prices, and excess supply forces
firms having unsold goods to decrease their prices. Due to the homo-
geneity of the good, consumers buy from the lowest price firm. This
forces other firms follow a price decrease. The awareness of this neg-
ative relation between the industry level sales and unit price restricts
the speeding up of production of a single firm even when market price
exceeds the firm’s marginal costs. This inertia in the firms’ adjustment
of production is included in our modeling. Other, more inherent fac-
tors for the inertial phenomena, are the inevitable delays in adjusting
the use of manpower, finding finance for new machinery or production
room, time needed for constructions etc.
Strictly taken, we ought to analyze the expected profits of firms
because if production takes time, the realized profits depend on the
future price. If, however, firms know their cost functions and expect
the price to stay fixed, then the analysis is the same in both cases.
Introducing price and cost uncertainties are possible future extensions
of the present model.
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The time derivative of the profit function is
Π′i(t) = p
′(t)qi(t)− ∂Ci
∂t
+
[
p(t)− ∂Ci
∂qi
]
q′i(t). (3)
Because price changes p′(t) are out of the control of the firm, and we do
not model reasons for ∂Ci/∂t < 0 — which would essentially complicate
our model — but only study their role in the growth of the industry, a
profit-seeking firm changes its only policy variable qi as follows:
q′i(t) > 0 when p(t)−
∂Ci
∂qi
(
t, qi(t)
)
> 0,
q′i(t) < 0 when p(t)−
∂Ci
∂qi
(
t, qi(t)
)
< 0,
q′i(t) = 0 when p(t)−
∂Ci
∂qi
(
t, qi(t)
)
= 0.
The first two rules above make the third additive term in Eq. (3) posi-
tive thus increasing profit with time. The last rule means that the firm
does not change qi(t) when this does not affect its profit
2.
Now, q′i(t) with unit unit/y
2 corresponds to the acceleration on pro-
duction. Imitating Newtonian mechanics, we call ∂Πi/∂qi — the reason
for this acceleration — the ‘force’ acting upon the velocity of production
of firm i. A relation, which fulfills the above adjustment rules, is
q′i(t) = Fi
(
∂Πi
∂qi
)
,
∂Πi
∂qi
= p(t)− ∂Ci
∂qi
(
t, qi(t)
)
, t ∈ R, (4)
where Fi :R → R is strictly increasing with Fi(0) = 0. Firm i thus
adjusts qi according to the deviation between the (expected) price and
marginal costs, which adjustment process [5] named ‘myopic’. The first
order Taylor approximation of function Fi in the neighborhood of the
optimum point ∂Πi/∂qi = 0 is
Fi
(
∂Πi
∂qi
)
= Fi(0) + F
′
i (0)
(
∂Πi
∂qi
− 0
)
+ i ≈ F ′i (0)
∂Πi
∂qi
,
if the residual term i is assumed negligible. With this approximation,
we can write Eq. (4) as
mqiq
′
i(t) =
∂Πi
∂qi
where mqi =
1
F ′i (0)
. (5)
The last form of the equation exactly corresponds to the Newtonian
formulation for dynamics where non-negative constant mqi with unit
$ × y2/unit2 is the ratio between force and acceleration. Following
Newton, we interpret mqi as the inertial factor (the ‘mass’) of the
velocity of production of firm i. The magnitude of mqi measures the
2The proposed adjustment rules are explained verbally in elementary textbooks
of economics: if marginal revenues > (<) marginal costs, a firm raises (lowers) its
production. See, for example, [3, p. 138].
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inertia in this adjustment. With these assumptions, Eq. (5) exactly
corresponds to the Newtonian formulation for dynamics: ma = F ,
where a = q′i(t) and F = ∂Πi/∂qi. The resulting equation is
mqiq
′
i(t) = p(t)−
∂Ci
∂qi
(
t, qi(t)
)
, t ∈ R. (6)
Example. Let the cost function of a firm for time unit y be C(t, q) =
a + bq + (c/2)q2, where a, b, c are nonnegative constants with proper
units, and the firm has no price setting power. Eq. (6) then becomes
mqq
′(t) = p− b− cq(t), t ∈ R, (7)
and providing that the unit price p is constant, it has the solution
q(t) =
p− b
c
+
(
q(0)− p− b
c
)
e−ct/mq , t ∈ R.
With t → ∞, q(t) → (p − b)/c which maximizes the firm’s profit.
Neoclassical theory thus corresponds to the asymptotic steady-state —
the zero force situation — in the Newtonian formulation.
Example. Let us consider a physical analogy. A stone of mass m is
dropped from an airplane at the height y0. The height of the stone
at time moment t is denoted by y(t). The stone is moved downwards
by the gravitation force −mg, g = 9, 81 (m/s2), and upwards by the
air friction −Cy′(t), where C is a positive constant. The Newtonian
equation of movement reads as
my′′(t) = −mg − Cy′(t), t ∈ R. (8)
A comparison to (7) gives that p−b is a gravitation like force and−cq(t)
is like a velocity dependent friction force. In both cases, the velocity
functions q(t) and y′(t) adjust exponentially toward a stationary state,
where the resultant of forces vanishes.
3. An Individual Consumer
We model consumer behavior analogously with that in the previous
section. Consumer j is choosing between consumed magnitudes xj1, x2j
of two goods labeled 1 and 2 for a time period of length y. Good 1 is
a typical consumption good the consumer consumes every time unit.
Because we analyze the demand of good 1, good 2 is assumed to be a
basket of other goods the consumer spends money during the time unit.
[19] proved the existence of an aggregate demand function for good 1
in this kind of a setting with a finite number of utility maximizing
consumers. Unit prices p1, p2 are exogenous for the consumer, and
we assume that the consumer has budgeted himself a fixed amount of
money Ij for consumption for the time unit. Suitable measurement
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units for the quantities are x1j : unit/y, x2j : kg/y, p1 : $/unit, p2 :
$/kg, Ij : $/y. The budget equation is then
Ij(t) = p1x1j(t) + p2x2j(t).
Consumer j has utility function u˜j(t) = uj
(
t, x1j(t), x2j(t)
)
measur-
ing his satisfaction during time unit y in units util/y; time t in the
function allows the consumer’s preferences change with time. The first
order partials of the utility function with respect to the consumption
velocities are assumed continuous and positive, and the second order
differential d2uj to be negatively definite everywhere
3. Consumer j
likes to increase his utility with time. We solve the budget equation as
x2j(t) =
(
Ij(t)− p1x1j(t)
)
/p2 and write the utility function as
u˜j
(
t, x1j(t), Ij(t), p1, p2
)
= uj
(
t, x1j(t),
Ij(t)− p1x1j(t)
p2
)
. (9)
With fixed Ij, the constrained two variable utility maximization prob-
lem reduces to a one variable maximization problem. A necessary con-
dition for its resolvability is
du˜j
dx1j
=
∂uj
∂x1j
− p1
p2
∂uj
∂x2j
= 0, (10)
under which a sufficient condition for the existence of a local maximal
utility is d2u˜j/dx
2
1 < 0. Since
d2u˜j
dx21j
=
∂2uj
∂x21j
− 2p1
p2
∂2uj
∂x1j∂x2j
+
(
p1
p2
)2
∂2uj
∂x22j
= d2uj
(
1,
p1
p2
)
< 0,
the latter condition is satisfied. With fixed prices we get the following
time derivative from (9):
du˜j
dt
=
∂uj
∂t
+
(
∂uj
∂x1j
− p1
p2
∂uj
∂x2j
)
x′1j(t) +
(
1
p2
∂uj
∂x2j
)
I ′j(t).
Increasing utility with time corresponds to du˜j/dt > 0. Because con-
sumer j has budgeted himself a fixed amount of money for the period,
I ′j(t) = 0, and because we do not model changes in the consumer’s
preferences, ∂uj/∂t, the consumer has only one policy variable, x1j.
Consumer j changes x1j to increase his utility with time as follows:
x′1j(t) > 0 when
∂uj
∂x1j
− p1
p2
∂uj
∂x2j
> 0,
x′1j(t) < 0 when
∂uj
∂x1j
− p1
p2
∂uj
∂x2j
< 0,
x′1j(t) = 0 when
∂uj
∂x1j
− p1
p2
∂uj
∂x2j
= 0. (11)
3Under our differentiability assumptions, (x1, x2) 7→ uj(x1, x2) is a concave func-
tion if and only if d2uj is negatively semidefinite everywhere.
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Now, x′1j(t) with unit unit/y
2 measures the ‘change in the consumer’s
velocity of consumption of good 1’ or his ‘acceleration of consumption of
good 1’. Following Newton, we identify the reason for this acceleration,
∂uj/∂x1j − p1/p2
(
∂uj/∂x2j
)
with unit util/unit, as the ‘force’ acting
upon the velocity of consumption of good 1 of consumer j. Measuring
this force is problematic, however, because measuring utility in units
util is difficult4. Due to this we multiply the inequalities (11) by the
positive factor p2/
(
∂uj/∂x2j
)
and get
x′1j(t) > 0 when p2
(
∂uj
∂x1j
/ ∂uj
∂x2j
)
− p1 > 0 etc. (12)
Quantity
hj
(
t, x1j(t), Ij(t), p1, p2
)
= p2
(
∂uj
∂x1j
/ ∂uj
∂x2j
)
(13)
with unit $/unit measures the consumer’s ‘willingness to pay for one
unit of good 1’. In (12) the force hj − p1 is measurable because p1 is
measurable and we can quantify hj by a questionnaire. Eq. (12) implies
that consumer j increases his consumption of good 1 if he is willing to
pay more than the price p1 and vice versa. Increases in ∂uj/∂x1j and
p2, and decreases in ∂uj/∂x2j increase hj. The income and substitution
effects of other goods are thus present in the formulation.
The above described dynamic behavior can be modeled as
x′1j(t) = Gj
(
hj − p1
)
, t ∈ R, (14)
where Gj :R → R is strictly increasing with Gj(0) = 0. The first
order Taylor approximation of function Gj in the neighborhood of the
optimum point hj − p1 = 0 is
Gj (hj − p1) = Gj(0) +G′j(0) (hj − p1 − 0) + j ≈ G′j(0)(hj − p1),
if the residual term j is assumed negligible. With this approximation,
we can write Eq. (14) as
m1jx
′
1j(t) = hj − p1, m1j =
1
G′j(0)
, t ∈ R, (15)
where nonnegative constant m1j with unit ($ × y2)/unit2 is the ratio
between force and acceleration. The magnitude of m1j measures the
inertia in this adjustment. Following Newton, we call m1j the inertial
factor (‘mass’) of the velocity of consumption of good 1 of consumer
j. The zero force situation in Eq. (15), p2∂uj/∂x1j = p1∂uj/∂x2j,
corresponds to neoclassical theory.
Example. Suppose that the utility function of a consumer is of the
form: u(t) = z1 ln
(
z2x1(t)x2(t)
)
, where x1, x2 are as above and z1, z2
4This problem disappears, if one uses $ as the measure unit of utility. However,
unit $ may not be a proper one for measuring satisfaction, see [10].
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are positive constants with units util/y and y2/(kg × unit), respec-
tively. Utility is thus measured in units util/y and the argument of
the logarithmic function is dimensionless as it should, see [10, p. 141].
The budget equation is: I = p1x1(t) + p2x2(t). Quantity h1 − p1 then
takes the form: I/(2x1)− p1. Now, h1(x1)− p1 = 0 when p1x1 = I/2.
Setting h1−p1 as the force in Eq. (15), a nonlinear differential equation
results. Its implicit solutions
2p1x1(t) = I +K exp
(
−4p1t
m1
)
exp
(
−2p1x1(t)
I
)
, K ∈ R,
can be found by separating the variables. The constant K is de-
termined by the initial condition x1(0) = x0, x0 ∈ ]0, I/p1[. Since
0 < exp (−2p1x1(t)/I) < 1, it follows that∣∣∣x1(t)− I
2p1
∣∣∣ ≤ |K|
2p1
exp
(
−4p1t
m1
)
for all t > 0.
Hence, x1(t) → I/(2p1) exponentially, as t → ∞, which zero-force
situation corresponds to neoclassical theory. The time path for x2(t)
can be obtained from x1(t) using the budget equation.
4. Average Firm and Consumer Behavior
For simplicity, the market is modeled on the basis of the firms’ and
consumers’ average behavior. Analogous simplifications are made in
physics. For example, the macroscopic laws of gases are written on the
basis of the average behavior of molecules due to their huge number.
Because we study the market of good 1, we set p1(t) = p(t) and as-
sume p2 fixed. When every firm and consumer have adjusted optimally,
we have
p(t) =
∂Ci
∂qi
(
t, qi(t)
)
, i = 1, . . . n, and p(t) = hj, j = 1, . . . ,m.
Adding the above n andm equations separately and dividing the results
by n and m, respectively, we get
p(t) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
∂Ci
∂qi
(
t, qi(t)
)
=
1
m
m∑
j=1
hj
(
t, x1j(t), Ij(t), p, p2
)
,(17)
where the middle term is the average of marginal costs of firms at the
aggregate velocity of production qs(t) =
∑n
i=1 qi(t), and 1/m
∑m
j=1 hj
is the consumers’ average willingness to pay for one unit of good 1 at
the aggregate velocity of consumption qd(t) =
∑m
j=1 x1j(t); subscripts
s, d refer to supply and demand5. Eq. (17) defines the inverse relations
of market supply and demand. In the equilibrium, unit price equals the
average of firms’ marginal costs and consumers’ willingness to pay for
5However, the last terms are functions of (q1, . . . , qn) and (x11, . . . , x1m),
respectively.
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one unit, and no agent likes to change his behavior. This corresponds
to neoclassical equilibrium.
The first order Taylor expansions of the firms’ marginal cost func-
tions in the neighborhood of the equilibrium velocities qi0 at t0 are
∂Ci
∂qi
(
t, qi(t)
)
=
∂Ci
∂qi
(
t0, qi0
)
+
∂2Ci
∂t∂qi
(
t0, qi0
)(
t− t0
)
+
∂2Ci
∂q2i
(
t0, qi0
)(
qi(t)− qi0
)
+ ˜i, i = 1, . . . , n;
˜i is the residual term. Assuming ˜i ≈ 0 and summing over i, we get
n∑
i=1
∂Ci
∂qi
(
t, qi(t)
) ≈ n∑
i=1
[∂Ci
∂qi
(t0, qi0)− ∂
2Ci
∂t∂qi
(
t0, qi0
)
t0 (18)
−∂
2Ci
∂q2i
(
t0, qi0
)
qi0 +
∂2Ci
∂t∂qi
(
t0, qi0
)
t+
∂2Ci
∂q2i
(
t0, qi0
)
qi(t)
]
≈ a0 + a1t+ a2
n
qs(t),
where6
a0 =
n∑
i=1
[∂Ci
∂qi
(t0, qi0)− ∂
2Ci
∂t∂qi
(
t0, qi0
)
t0 − ∂
2Ci
∂q2i
(t0, qi0) qi0
]
,
a1 =
n∑
i=1
∂2Ci
∂t∂qi
(
t0, qi0
)
and a2 =
n∑
i=1
∂2Ci
∂q2i
(t0, qi0)
are constants with units $/unit, $/(unit×y) and ($×y)/unit2, respec-
tively, and qs(t) =
∑n
i=1 qi(t).
Because marginal costs are positive at every t, qs, then a0 > 0 (take
t, qs → 0 in (18)). The assumed technological progress means that
∂2Ci/∂t∂q ≤ 0 for all i = 1, . . . , n, and so a1 ≤ 0. At the aggregate
level increasing (decreasing) returns to scale in the industry correspond
to a2 < 0 (a2 > 0). An approximate average of the firms’ marginal costs
thus linearly depends on the total velocity of production of the industry
and time,
g
(
t, qs(t)
) ≡ 1
n
n∑
i=1
∂Ci
∂qi
(
t, qi(t)
) ≈ a0
n
+
a1
n
t+
a2
n2
qs(t). (19)
The average consumer behavior is defined similarly. The first order
Taylor expansions of the consumers’ willingness to pay functions in
the neighborhood of the equilibrium velocities of consumption x1j0 and
6Because
∑n
i=1 ciqi = c
∑n
i=1 qi +
∑n
i=1(ci − c)qi where c = (1/n)
∑n
i=1 ci, the
approximation is the more accurate the less ci = ∂2Ci/∂q2i or qi vary, i = 1, . . . , n.
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budgeted funds Ij0 at time moment t0, are
hj
(
t, x1j(t), Ij(t), p, p2
)
= hj0 +
∂hj
∂t
(z0) (t− t0)
+
∂hj
∂x1j
(z0)
(
x1j(t)− x1j0
)
+
∂hj
∂Ij
(z0) (Ij(t)− Ij0) + ˜j,
where (z0) = (t0, x1j0, Ij0, p0, p20) and ˜j is the residual term. Assuming
˜j ≈ 0, j = 1, . . . ,m, and summing over the consumers, we get
m∑
j=1
hj ≈
m∑
j=1
[
hj0 − ∂hj
∂t
(z0)t0 − ∂hj
∂x1j
(z0)x1j0 − ∂hj
∂Ij
(z0)Ij0
]
(20)
+t
m∑
j=1
∂hj
∂t
(z0) +
m∑
j=1
∂hj
∂x1j
(z0)x1j(t) +
m∑
j=1
∂hj
∂Ij
(z0)Ij(t)
≈ b0 + b1t+ b2
m
qd(t) +
b3
m
I(t),
where7
b0 =
m∑
j=1
[
hj0 − ∂hj
∂t
(z0)t0 − ∂hj
∂x1j
(z0)x1j0 − ∂hj
∂Ij
(z0)Ij0
]
,
b1 =
m∑
j=1
∂hj
∂t
(z0), b2 =
m∑
j=1
∂hj
∂x1j
(z0), b3 =
m∑
j=1
∂hj
∂Ij
(z0)
are constants with units $/unit, $/(unit×y), ($×y)/unit2 and y/unit,
respectively, and qd(t) =
∑m
j=1 x1j(t), I(t) =
∑m
j=1 Ij(t).
Because the willingness to pay of every consumer is non-negative
at every t, qd, I, then b0 ≥ 0 (take t, qd, I → 0 in (20)). Increasing
(decreasing) popularity of this good with time corresponds to b1 > 0
(b1 < 0). For normal goods b2 < 0 and b3 > 0, for Giffen goods
b2 > 0 and for inferior goods b3 < 0. An approximate average of
the consumers’ willingness to pay for one unit of good 1 thus linearly
depends on time, the total velocity of consumption of good 1 and the
total flow of money the consumers have budgeted for consumption for
the period,
h
(
t, qd(t), I(t)
) ≡ 1
m
m∑
j=1
hj ≈ b0
m
+
b1
m
t+
b2
m2
qd(t) +
b3
m2
I(t). (21)
The existence of an aggregate demand function in an m -consumer case
has been earlier proved by [19] and [11].
7See the previous footnote.
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5. Industry Level Analysis
The adjustment of production and consumption is modeled on the
basis of the firms’ and consumers’ average behavior, and the law of
demand and supply introduced by [17] is assumed to determine the
velocity of the unit price p′(t) with unit $/(unit× y):
q′s(t) = ξs
(
p(t)− g(t, qs(t))), t ∈ R, (22)
q′d(t) = ξd
(
h
(
t, qd(t), I(t)
)− p(t)), t ∈ R, (23)
p′(t) = ξp
(
qd(t)− qs(t)
)
, t ∈ R, (24)
where ξs, ξd, ξp :R → R are strictly increasing with ξs(0) = ξd(0) =
ξp(0) = 0. The economic content of Eq. (24) was explained in Section
2 when we discussed how excess demand and supply motivate firms to
change their prices.
System (22-24) defines the time paths for qs, qd, p. The standard
way to study the local stability of system (22-24) is to take its first
order Taylor expansion in the neighborhood of the steady-state q′s(t) =
q′d(t) = p
′(t) = 0 and study that system. The first order Taylor approx-
imations give the following linear system which fulfills the requirements
for functions ξs, ξd, ξp:
msq
′
s(t) = p(t)− g
(
t, qs(t)
)
, t ∈ R, (25)
mdq
′
d(t) = h
(
t, qd(t), I(t)
)− p(t), t ∈ R, (26)
mpp
′(t) = qd(t)− qs(t), t ∈ R; (27)
the non-negative constants ms,md,mp can be identified
8 as the ‘iner-
tial factors (‘masses’) of aggregate supply, demand and the unit price’,
respectively9; mp has unit unit
2/$.
To get an analytic solution for the system (25)-(27), we assume
g(t, qs(t)) and h(t, qd(t), I(t)) as in (19) and (21), and a linear time
trend in I(t) = b4t where parameter b4 ≥ 0 has unit $/y2. The solu-
tions with specific parameter values are displayed in Figures 1-4 where
unit price is the thickest and supply the thinnest curve. The solutions
imply that the system converges with time to fixed values or steady-
state paths. Growth in qd, qs may occur in situations: b1 > 0, b3, b4 > 0,
a1 < 0 and a2 < 0. These can be called preference, wealth, technol-
ogy and increasing returns to scale based growth, respectively. The
reason for the growth of the industry may thus be demand or supply.
One clear difference between these cases exists, however. If the origin
8Notice that Eq. (27) does not exactly correspond to the Newtonian formulation.
9We can also interpret our modeling in probability terms. If every firm (con-
sumer) has an equal probability 1/n (1/m) to be the producer (consumer) of one
unit of good 1 in the industry, then p(t)−1/n∑ni=1 ∂Ci/∂qi and 1/m∑mj=1 hj−p(t),
respectively, measure the expected value of the willingness of the firms (consumers)
to expand the velocity of production (consumption) of good 1.
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of the growth is demand, then p, qs, qd all have a positive time trend
(cases b3, b4 > 0 and b1 > 0 both give time paths as in Figure 3). On
the other hand, if the origin of the growth is supply, then p will de-
crease and qs, qd increase with time (in Figure 2, a1 < 0 and in Figure
4, a2 < 0). These differences can be observed empirically. Technology
based growth thus cannot last forever because the decreasing price level
will cause bankruptcies of firms with time.
Next, we study the solutions of the general system (25) - (27). At
time moment t = 0 the price, the consumption and the production
velocities are known real numbers, say p0, qd0 and qs0, respectively.
The system is described by
d
dt
(
p(t), ηqd(t), ηqs(t)
)
= A(t)
(
p(t), ηqd(t), ηqs(t)
)
+f
(
t, p(t), qd(t), qs(t)
)
, t ∈ [0,∞[, (28)(
p(0), qd(0), qs(0)
)
= (p0, qd0, qs0), (29)
where the linear mappings A(t) :R3 → R3, t ∈ R, are given by their
matrices
matA(t) =
 0 1/(ηmp) −1/(ηmp)−η/md ∂h∂qd (t, 0)/md 0
η/ms 0 −∂2C∂q2s (t, 0)/ms
 (30)
and f :R×R3 → R3 is given by
f1(t, y1, y2, y3) = 0
f2(t, y1, y2, y3) =
η
md
(
h(t, y2)− ∂h∂qd (t, 0)y2
)
,
f3(t, y1, y2, y3) =
η
ms
(
∂2C
∂q2s
(t, 0)y3 − ∂C∂qs (t, y3)
)
.
(31)
For the dimensional homogeneity of (28), appears a positive constant
η the dimension of which equals with that of p/qd, cf. [10].
6. A Linear Autonomous Case
We assume that the average production costs and the willingness to
pay are given by
C(t, qs) = C0 + aqs +
1
2
bq2s , h(t, qd) = c− dqd, (32)
where a, C0, b, c, d are dimensional constants all of which are posi-
tive except a, which may be any real number. Then A(t) = A and
f = (0, ηc/md,−ηa/ms), given by (30)-(31), are constants. In this
case the marginal costs are increasing and the willingness to pay is
decreasing. Moreover, a, b, c, and d can be chosen such that (32) is an
approximation of more general smooth C(t, qs) and h(t, qd). We iden-
tify the linear mappings and the corresponding matrices. Hence the
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solution of the initial value problem (28)-(29) is given by p(t)ηqd(t)
ηqs(t)
 = eAt
 p0ηqd0
ηqs0
+ A−1f
− A−1f , t ∈ [0,∞[, (33)
since detA = −(b+ d)/(mdmpms) 6= 0, i.e. A is invertible.
Next, we present some properties of the matrix A. Let us denote
α =
dms + bmd
mdms
, β =
md +ms + bdmp
mdmpms
, γ =
b+ d
mdmsmp
. (34)
Lemma 6.1. The inverse of the matrix A is
A−1 =
1
b+ d
−bdmp −bmd/η dms/ηηbmp −md −ms
−ηdmp −md −ms
 . (35)
Lemma 6.2. The eigenvalues λ1, λ2 and λ3 of the matrix A satisfy:
λ1 ∈ I1 : =
]
− α
3 + γ
α2 + β
,−γ
β
[
;
Reλ2, Reλ3 ∈ I2 : =
]
− αβ − γ
2β
,− αβ − γ
2(α2 + β)
[
, if Imλ2 6= 0;
λ2, λ3 ∈ I3 : =
]
− α,−γ
β
[
otherwise.
The intervals I1, I2 and I3 above are nonempty. Moreover, Imλ2 6= 0,
if α2 ≤ 3β.
Proof. The characteristic polynomial of A is fA(λ) = det(A − λ) =
λ3+αλ2+βλ+γ and it takes values of opposite signs at the endpoints
of I1. Thus λ1 ∈ I1. The two other eigenvalues are then
−α+ λ1
2
± 1
2
√
(α+ λ1)2 − 4β − 4αλ1 − 4λ12.
Thus Re λ2, Re λ3 ∈ I2, if Im λ2 6= 0. Also the sufficient condition
for imaginarity of λ2 and λ3 is obtained. If all the eigenvalues are real,
they belong to I3, since the characteristic polynomial does not take the
value zero on R \ I3. q.e.d.
Lemma 6.3. There is a positive constant CA, depending only on the
matrix A, such that for each t ∈ [0,∞[ and y ∈ R3,
‖eAty‖ ≤
{
CAe
− γ
β
t‖y‖, if Imλ2 = 0,
CAe
−δt‖y‖ otherwise,
where
δ = min
{
γ
β
,
αβ − γ
2(α2 + β)
}
> 0.
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Proof. The proof is straightforward. It is based on the equivalence of A
to its canonical Jordan’s form and on the formula eAt =
∑∞
n=0
1
n!
(At)n.
q.e.d.
Remark 6.1. There exist sequences of matrices of the form of (30),
for which CA →∞.
By these lemmas we obtain the following results on the asymptotic
behavior and the stability of the solution of (28)-(29).
Theorem 6.1. (Asymptotic stability) For each t ∈ [0,∞[ ,∣∣∣p(t)− ad+ bc
b+ d
∣∣∣+ η∣∣∣qd(t)− c− a
b+ d
∣∣∣+ η∣∣∣qs(t)− c− a
b+ d
∣∣∣
≤
√
3 CAe
−δt
(∣∣∣p0 − ad+ bc
b+ c
∣∣∣+ η∣∣∣qd0 − c− a
b+ d
∣∣∣+ η∣∣∣qs0 − c− a
b+ d
∣∣∣) .
Theorem 6.2.
lim
t→∞
p(t) = lim
t→∞
h
(
t, qd(t)
)
= lim
t→∞
∂C
∂qs
(
t, qs(t)
)
, lim
t→∞
qd(t) = lim
t→∞
qs(t).
Theorem 6.3. (Stability with respect to initial conditions). Assume
that (p, qd, qs) and (p˜, q˜d, q˜s) are two solutions of (28) with the initial
values (p0, qd0, qs0) and (p˜0, q˜d0, q˜s0) ∈ R3, respectively. Then, for each
t ∈ [0,∞[, ∣∣∣p(t)− p˜(t)∣∣∣+ η∣∣∣qd(t)− q˜d(t)∣∣∣+ η∣∣∣qs(t)− q˜s(t)∣∣∣
≤
√
3CA e
−δt
(
|p0 − p˜0|+ η|qd0 − qd0|+ η|qs0 − q˜s0|
)
.
Remark 6.2. Consider the case where ms and md are very small as
compared to bdmp. Since δ → (b+d)/(bdmp) as ms,md → 0+, we have
δ ≈ (b+ d)/(bdmp).
Remark 6.3. The formula (33) gives also a general explicit continuous
dependence for the solution of the initial value problem (28)-(29) on the
parameters a, b, c, d, md, mp, ms, and on the initial value (p0, qd0, qs0).
7. A nonhomogeneus linear case
We return to consider the average firm and consumer behavior, i.e.,
equations (25)-(27), (19), and (21) with a2 > 0 and b2 < 0. We are
solving a homogeneous linear equation
y′(t)− Ay(t) = f(t), t ∈ [0,∞[, (36)
where A is given by its inverse with the replacements b = a2/n
2 and
d = −b2/m2 in (35) and f(t) =
(
0, f2(t), f3(t)
)
,
f2(t) =
η
mmd
(
b0 + b1t+
b3b4
m
t
)
, f3(t) = − η
nms
(a0 + a1t).
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We recall the variation of constant formula for the solution of (36) with
the initial condition y(0) = y0 ∈ R3:
y(t) = eAt y0 +
∫ t
0
eA(t−s) f(s) ds, t ∈ [0,∞[, (37)
By integrating by parts this gives
y(t) = eAt
(
y0 + A
−1f(0) + A−2f ′(0)
)
−A−1(f(0) + A−1f ′(0))− A−1f ′(0)t for all t ∈ [0,∞[.
Due to Lemmas 6.2 and 6.3, the first term decays exponentially, as
t → ∞. Hence, there exist affine functions10 p∞, qd∞, qs∞ : [0,∞[→ R
such that
p(t)− p∞(t)→ 0, qd(t)− qd∞(t)→ 0, qs(t)− qs∞(t)→ 0
exponentially, as t→∞. This behavior can also be seen in Figures 1-4.
8. A Smooth Nonlinear Autonomous Case
Next we consider the case in which the marginal costs and the will-
ingness to pay are given by
∂C
∂qs
(t, qs) = g(qs), h(t, qd) = h(qd), (38)
where g, h :R → R. If g′(0) > 0 and h′(0) < 0, the matrix A(t) is the
same constant as in the previous section. But f is different;
f(t,x) =
(
0, η
(
h(x2)− h′(0)x2
)
/md, η
(
g′(0)x3 − g(x3
)
/ms
)
. (39)
Define
Q =
{
x ∈ R | h(x) = g(x), h′(x) = h′(0), g′(x) = g′(0)}. (40)
Theorem 8.1. Let g, h :R → R be locally Lipschitzian with g′(0) >
0 and h′(0) < 0, and let there be q∞ ∈ Q at which g′ and h′ are
continuous. Then the solution (p, qd, qs) of (28)-(29) satisfies for some
positive constant δq∞:∣∣p(t)− h(q∞)∣∣+ η∣∣qd(t)− q∞∣∣+ η∣∣qs(t)− q∞∣∣→ 0,
as |p0 − h(q∞)|+ η|qd0 − q∞|+ η|qs0 − q∞| → 0 uniformly in t;∣∣p(t)− h(q∞)∣∣+ η∣∣qd(t)− q∞∣∣+ η∣∣qs(t)− q∞∣∣→ 0,
as t→∞ if |p0 − h(q∞)|+ η|qd0 − q∞|+ η|qs0 − q∞| ≤ δq∞ .
Proof. The proof follows the lines of [16, pp. 33–34, 75]. q.e.d.
Remark 8.1. Depending on the nonlinear behavior of g and h it may
happen that the solution of (28)-(29) does not converge at all, as t →
∞, if (p(0), qd(0), qs(0)) is not close enough to (h(q∞), q∞, q∞).
10That is, p∞(t) = p1 + p2t, where p1, p2 ∈ R are constants, etc.
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9. A Monotone Nonlinear Autonomous Case
Next, we consider by different methods a class of nonlinear auto-
nomous cases: we assume very little on the smoothness of the marginal
costs and the willingness to pay, but we assume them to be monotone.
Indeed, we do not assume them to be continuous, single-valued or ev-
erywhere defined. For example, constraints like 0 ≤ qs ≤ qmax are
included. Our assumptions allow us to prove the stabilization of the
solution, as t → ∞, for any initial conditions. We can also show that
the dynamic model of [17] with only one differential equation is a limit
case of our theory, as the inertial masses of supply and demand tend
to zero, that is, the dynamic equations for qs, qd, tend to stationary
equations.
Let us recall some notions of nonlinear analysis. For further details
the reader may refer e.g. [4]. Let H be a real Hilbert space with the
inner product ( · , · )H and the norm ‖ · ‖H . We denote the interior
of the set C ⊂ H by Int C. A set B ⊂ H × H is an operator H,
its domain is D(B) = {x ∈ H | (x, y) ∈ B, for some y ∈ H}, its
value at x ∈ H is Bx={y | (x, y) ∈ B}, and its inverse is B−1 =
{(y, x) | (x, y) ∈ B}. An operator B ⊂ H × H is monotone, if (y2 −
y1, x2− x1)H ≥ 0, for each (x1, y1), (x2, y2) ∈ B. A monotone operator
A ⊂ H × H is maximal monotone operator if it is not contained by
any other monotone operator B ⊂ H ×H. An operator B ⊂ H ×H is
strongly monotone, if there is µ > 0 such that
(y2 − y1, x2 − x1)H ≥ µ‖x1 − x2‖2H , for each (x1, y1), (x2, y2) ∈ B.
Let T > 0, k = 1, 2, . . . , and r ∈ [1,∞[. By Lr(0, T ) we denote
the space of Lebesgue measurable functions u : [0, T ] → R, for which∫ T
0
|u(t)|r dt <∞. By C([0, T ];Rk) we denote the space of continuous
functions [0, T ]→ Rk, etc. The Sobolev space W k,r(0, T ) is given by
W 1,r(0, T ) = {u : [0, T ]→ R | u(t) = u(0) +
∫ t
0
v(τ) dτ,
for each t ∈ [0, T ] and for some v ∈ Lr(0, T )}.
Theorem 9.1. Let mp,md,ms > 0, p0, qd0, qs0, q∞ ∈ R and g,−h ⊂
R × R be maximal monotone operators such that g(q∞) ∩ h(q∞) 6= ∅.
If the problem
mpp
′(t) = qd(t)− qs(t), mdq′d(t) ∈ h(qd(t))− p(t),
msq
′
s(t) ∈ p(t)− g(qs(t)), for a.e. t ∈]0,∞[, (41)
p(0) = p0, qd(0) = qd0, qs(0) = qs0, (42)
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has a solution11 (p, ηqd, ηqs) ∈ C
(
[0,∞[;R3) which satisfies p′, q′d, q′s ∈
L2(0, k), for each k > 0, then
mp(p(t)− p∞)2 +md(qd(t)− q∞)2 +ms(qs(t)− q∞)2
≤ mp(p0 − p∞)2 +md(qd0 − q∞)2 +ms(qs0 − q∞)2, (43)
for each t ≥ 0 and p∞ ∈ g(q∞) ∩ h(q∞). If, in addition, g and −h are
strongly monotone, then for some p∞ ∈ g(q∞) ∩ h(q∞),
|p(t)− p∞|+ η|qd(t)− q∞|+ η|qs(t)− q∞| → 0, as t→∞. (44)
Proof. By (41) and the monotonicity of g and −h,
d
dt
(
mp
(
p(t)− p∞
)2
+md
(
qd(t)− q∞
)2
+ms
(
qs(t)− q∞)2
)
≤ 0
for a.a. t ∈]0, T [. This implies (43). The rest of proof is a straight-
forward application of the standard techniques of the theory of nonlin-
ear differential equations with maximal monotone operators (the chain
rule, the demiclosedness of maximal monotone operators, etc.), see e.g.
[4]. We just mention that the key idea is to consider the functions
pn(t) = p(n+ t), qdn(t) = qd(n+ t) and qsn(t) = qs(n+ t), n = 1, 2, . . . ,
in the space L2(0, 1). q.e.d.
Theorem 9.2. Let g,−h ⊂ R × R be strongly monotone maximal
monotone operators and let T,mp,M0 > 0, p0 ∈ R, qd0 ∈ IntD(h),
and qs0 ∈ IntD(g) be fixed. Let the problem (41)–(42) have a solution
(p, ηqd, ηqs) on [0, T ], p, qd, qs ∈ W 1,2(0, T ), for each md,ms ∈]0,M0].
Then there are qd∞, qs∞ ∈ W 1,2(0, T ), p∞ ∈ W 2,2(0, T ) and a constant
M > 0 which satisfy, as md,ms → 0+,
mpp
′
∞(t) = qd∞(t)− qs∞(t), for a.e. t ∈]0, T [, (45)
p∞(0) = p0, (46)
p∞(t) ∈ h(qd∞(t)) ∩ g(qs∞(t)), for each t ∈ [0, T ], (47)
p(t)→ p∞(t) uniformly on [0, T ], (48)
qd(t)→ qd∞(t), qs(t)→ qs∞(t), for a.e. t ∈]0, T [, (49)
mdq
′
d(t), msq
′
s(t)→ 0, for a.e. t ∈]0, T [, (50)
|p(t)− p∞(t)|+ ‖mdq′d‖L2(0,t) + ‖msq′s‖L2(0,t) (51)
+η‖qd − qd∞‖L2(0,t) + η‖qs − qs∞‖L2(0,t)
≤M(√md +√ms), for each t ∈ [0, T ].
Proof. We just give the idea of the proof. The same techniques as
in the proof of Theorem 9.1 are applied. Observe that the uniform
convergence of qd and qs is not stated. The reason is that the problem
11To be a solution means that qd, qs, and p are differentiable a.e. on ]0, T [,
continuous on [0, T ], qd(t) ∈ D(g), qs(t) ∈ D(f) for a.a t ∈]0, T [, and they satisfy
(41)-(42).
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(41)-(42) is of form (Ay)′+By 3 0 where A and B are maximal mono-
tone operators in R3, not of the form y′ + Cy 3 0 with monotone C.
q.e.d.
Remark 9.1. By the approach used in [9] it can be proved that these
convergence properties as well as the continuous dependence of the so-
lution of (41) on the initial conditions hold also in the case of time
dependent but bounded g and h. The similar results can likely be real-
ized in the case of unbounded f and g. See [1].
Remark 9.2. Assume that g and −h are maximal monotone and
strongly monotone. Then g−1, −h−1, and L : = g−1 − h−1 are Lip-
schitzian. Then (45) reads as mpp
′ + Lp = 0, and thus (45)-(47) has
a unique solution, for any initial condition p0 ∈ R. Observe that (45)-
(47) is indeed the dynamical model of [17].
Let us finish this section by a theorem on the limit, as mp → 0+.
The proof is elementary.
Theorem 9.3. Let T > 0, p0 ∈ R, and p ∈ W 1,2(0, T ) be a solution of
(45). Assume that L above is strongly monotone with a constant µ > 0
and Lipschitzian. Then there is pˆ ∈ R such that Lpˆ = 0 and
|p(t)− pˆ| ≤ |p0 − pˆ|e−µt/mp , for each t ∈ [0, T ].
Remark 9.3. If g and −h are monotone and Lipschitzian, then L
is strongly monotone. In our linear autonomous case above all the
conditions of Theorems 9.1, 9.2 and 9.3 are satisfied. Moreover,
Lp =
b+ d
bd
p− ad+ bc
bd
, µ =
b+ d
bd
and pˆ =
ad+ bc
bd
.
Remark 9.4. If p0 = pˆ where Lpˆ = 0 and L is monotone, then the
equilibrium condition Lpˆ = 0 is a special case of the dynamical model
(45)-(47). Under the conditions of Theorem 9.3, Lpˆ = 0 is the limit
case mp → 0 of (45)-(47). These relations are part of the Correspon-
dence Principle described by Samuelson [18].
10. Conclusions
We presented a model of the behavior of an industry in perfect com-
petition. A new feature in the modeling is the consumers’ active role in
the evolution of the industry. We dynamized the consumer behavior so
that a consumer adjusts his consumption by comparing his willingness
to pay for one unit and the unit price. Firms adjust their production
flows by comparing the market price and their marginal costs, and price
adjusts at the market according to excess demand. The modeling was
executed on the basis of the agents’ average behavior.
One aim in our modeling was to show a link in between market be-
havior and economic growth. The model separates the industry level
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economic growth from business cycles, which occur due to the adjust-
ment of economic agents. Growth, on the other hand, may occur due to
increases in technology or consumers’ wealth, due to a positive change
in consumers’ preferences concerning this good or increasing returns to
scale. We showed that the proposed system is stable (i.e. its solution
is asymptotically stable and continuously depends on the data) under
certain monotonicity or continuity assumptions.
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